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NOTE 
NEWTON v. DIAMOND: 
WHEN A COMPOSER'S MARKET IS 
NOT THE AVERAGE JOE: THE 
INADEQUACY OF THE A VERAGE-
AUDIENCE TEST 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1978, avant-garde jazz flautist and composer James Newton 
composed "Choir," a song inspired by his early memory of four women 
singing gospel church music in rural Arkansas. I "Choir" is not a 
traditional song.2 In addition to its gospel music influence, "Choir" 
contains elements of Japanese ceremonial court music, classical music, 
and African music? The most untraditional sonic characteristics of the 
song, however, are achieved by playing the flute in a very unorthodox 
manner.4 The song requires that the performer play one note on the flute 
by over-blowing into the instrument while simultaneously singing a 
pattern of three other notes.5 The effect of this simultaneous over-
blowing and singing is a unique sound that is described as multiphonics.6 
I Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1191 (9th Cir. 2004). 
2 See generally, Petition For Writ Of Certiorari, Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (No. 04-1219). 
2(02). 
3 [d. at 3-4 (citing Appellant's excerpts of record filed in the Ninth Circuit on September 30, 
4 See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1194 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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In Newton's "Choir," this effect sounds something like the wind blowing 
briskly through the trees. 
Three years after composing the song, Newton performed and 
recorded "Choir.,,7 At that time, he licensed all rights in that sound 
recording of "Choir" to ECM Records for $5,000.8 However, Newton 
retained the copyright to the underlying composition of "Choir," as 
embodied in his written score of the song.9 
In 1992, the Beastie Boys sampled a six-second portion of "Choir" 
in the recording of their song, "Pass The Mic.,,10 At that time, the 
Beastie Boys obtained a license from ECM Records to use portions of 
the sound recording of "Choir" for a one-time fee of $1,000." However, 
the Beastie Boys did not obtain a license from Newton for use of the 
underlying composition of "Choir.,,12 As a result, Newton brought an 
action against the Beastie Boys in 2000 for copyright infringement of his 
composition "Choir.,,13 
In Newton v. Diamond, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
granted summary judgment in favor of the Beastie BoYS.14 The decision 
of the court was based on the sole ground that the Beastie Boys' 
unauthorized use of a sample of Newton's composition was trivial and 
therefore not significant enough to constitute infringement. 15 The court 
determined the sample's triviality by concluding that the average 
audience would not recognize Newton's hand as the composer of the 
Beastie Boys' sample. 16 This analysis is called the average-audience 
test, where an unauthorized use will be considered so trivial as to avoid 




10 Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1191 (9th Cir. 2004); See also id. at 1190 (describing 
sampling as "the incorporation of a short segment of a musical recording into a new musical 
recording .... "); See also Jarvis v. A & M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282, 286 (D.N.J. 1993) 
(describing sampling as "the conversion of analog sound waves into a digital code. The digital code 
that describes the sampled music . . . can then be reused, manipulated or combined with other 
digitalized or recorded sounds using a machine with digital data processing capabilities, such as a .. 
. computerized synthesizer." (quoting Judith Greenberg Finell, How a Musicologist Views Digital 
Sampling Issues, 207 N.Y.LJ. 7, n.3 (May 22, 1992»; See also 
http://en.wikipedia.orglwikilBeastie_Boys (describing the Beastie Boys as "an American hip-hop 
group from New York City."). 
II Newton, 388 F.3d at 1191. 
12 Id. 
13 Newton v. Diamond, 204 F.Supp.2d 1244, 1247 (C.D.Cal. 2002). 
14 Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1190 (9th Cir. 2004). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 1196. 
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copying has occurred. 17 
This Note will discuss how the Ninth Circuit incorrectly adopted the 
average-audience test because the test has become overbroad in its 
application, is ill-equipped to deal with the issues of complex modem 
music, and has drifted from the fundamental purpose of copyright law. 
The Ninth Circuit should have adopted the intended-audience test, which 
looks to the reaction of those with the expertise required to understand 
the language of the work and more truly reflects the fundamental purpose 
of copyright law: the protection of the creator's market. 18 
Part I of this Note will discuss the relevant background as it relates 
to the average-audience test. 19 Part II will examine the legal foundation 
that the Newton court relied on in its opinion.2o Part III will discuss the 
Newton court's analysis of the case in light of the legal foundation it 
established?1 Part III will also discuss the dissenting opinion in 
Newton?2 Part IV will examine a different approach taken by the courts 
by focusing on the Fourth Circuit's adoption of the more focused 
intended-audience test.23 Part V will reconsider the development of the 
average-audience test in the Ninth Circuit and compare the Ninth 
Circuit's reasoning to that of the Fourth Circuit. 24 Part VI will consider 
the benefits and burdens of the intended-audience test as practically 
applied?5 Finally, Part VII will conclude that the Ninth Circuit failed to 
clarify the law by adopting the average-audience test, and should have 
adopted the intended-audience test.26 
I. BACKGROUND 
Congress's power to grant copyright was founded on an economic 
incentive theory?? Because a musician's financial gain is a direct result 
of the public's approbation of his or her work, the best way to stimulate 
the arts for the benefit of the general public is through the encouragement 
of individual effort through personal financial gain.28 As a result, courts 
17 Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432,434 (9th Cir. 1986). 
18 See infra notes 93-114 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 27-38 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 39-52 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 53-81 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 82-92 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 93-114 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 115-128 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 129-146 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 147-151 and accompanying text. 
27 See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
28 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464,473 (2d Cir. 1946); See, e.g., Mazer. 347 U.S. at 219. 
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concluded that the impression of the general public, or lay listener, was 
the best method to determine infringement of a protected work.29 This 
sound foundational logic led to the development of the average-audience 
test, which looks to the reaction of the ordinary lay listener to determine 
whether an unauthorized use of a copyrighted musical work is 
sufficiently substantial to be considered infringement.3o 
The modern musical language is extremely diverse?l Today's 
musical vernacular includes such distinct genres as avant-garde jazz, 
minimalism, hip-hop, electronica, and microtonal music.32 Further, 
concurrent advances in technology have enabled a new generation of 
musicians to create music in new forms using their home computer.33 
This diversity of musical idioms and advance in technology have created 
a complexity to the modern musical language that challenges what is 
defined as popular music.34 Because popular music is not as easily 
defined as it once was, some courts have reconsidered the relevance of 
the average-audience test in light of the logic upon which it was 
developed?5 The Fourth Circuit, for example, has chosen to adopt the 
intended-audience test.36 This test focuses not on the reaction of the 
ordinary lay listener, but rather a listener who fairly represents that 
work's intended aUdience.37 While other courts have adopted a more 
29 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473. 
30 See id.; See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 434 (9th Cir. 1986). 
31 Motion of Amici Curiae For Leave To File Brief at 12, Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 
1189 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 04-1219) (arguing "the court should adopt an approach ... that respects 
the wide diversity of musical practice."). 
32 Petition For Writ Of Certiorari at 20, Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(No. 04-1219) (discussing the "breadth and diversity of style and manner among modem artists," 
e.g., Cecil Taylor, the late works of John Coltrane, Steve Reich, Phillip Glass, Run D.M.C., Dr. Dre, 
Orbital, Aphex Twin, Charles Ives, Harry Partch). 
33 Motion of Amici Curiae For Leave To File Brief at 9-10, Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 
1189 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 04-1219) (discussing the development of low-cost music editing software 
such as Pro-Tools). 
34 See generally, Motion of Amici Curiae For Leave To File Brief, Newton v. Diamond, 388 
F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 04-1219). 
35 Dawson v. Hinshaw, 905 F.2d 731, 737 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding '''intended audience' 
should supplant 'ordinary observer' as the label for the appropriate test."); Whelan Associates, Inc. 
v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1233 (3rd Cir. 1986) (arguing" ... the ordinary 
observer test is not useful and potentially misleading when the subjects of the copyright are 
particularly complex .... "); Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 857 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that "[iln 
cases where the target audience possesses specialized expertise, however, the specialist's perception 
of similarity may be much different from the lay observer's, and it is appropriate in such cases to 
consider similarity from the specialist's perspective."). 
36 Dawson, 905 F.2d at 736. 
37 Id. at 736-737 (holding "Such an inquiry may include ... testimony from members of the 
intended audience or, possibly, from those who possess expertise with reference to the tastes and 
perceptions of the intended aUdience."). 
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focused test, the Ninth Circuit has explicitly chosen to uphold the 
average-audience test in Newton v. Diamond?8 
II. THE MAJORITY OPINION: LAYING THE LEGAL FOUNDATION 
In the majority opinion written by Judge Mary M. Schroeder, the 
Ninth Circuit held that the Beastie Boys' unauthorized use of a sample of 
Newton's musical composition was trivial and therefore not actionable.39 
The court held that "trivial copying does not constitute actionable 
infringement.'.40 Although the District Court granted summary judgment 
in favor of the Beastie Boys on two separate grounds,41 the Ninth Circuit 
explicitly affirmed solely on the ground that the Beastie Boys' use was 
trivia1.42 The court affirmed that the test for triviality is whether or not 
the average audience would recognize the appropriation.43 
A. DE MINIMIS NON CURAT LEX: A TRIVIALITY DEFENSE TO 
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
The legal maxim "de minimis non curat lex" establishes the broad 
principle that the law does not concern itself with trifles.44 In 
determining the maxim's applicability to copyright law, the Newton court 
relied on Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television to conclude that 
"[f]or an unauthorized use of a copyrighted work to be actionable, the 
use must be significant enough to constitute infringement.',45 While the 
Ringgold court provided an extensive analysis of the de minimis maxim 
as it applied to copyright law,46 the Newton court relied on the decision 
to support its basic conclusion that even where the issue of copying is not 
in dispute (i.e., in the case of sampling), "no legal consequences will 
follow from that fact unless the copying is substantial.',47 In order to 
38 Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004). 
39 [d. at 1190. 
40 [d. at 1193; See, e.g., Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 
1997). 
41 Newton v. Diamond, 204 F.Supp.2d 1244, 1260 (C.D.Cal. 2002) (holding that the notes in 
question lacked sufficient originality to warrant copyright protection and, even if the sampled 
portion was sufficiently original, the use was trivial and therefore not actionable.). 
42 Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1190 (9th Cir. 2004). 
43 [d. at 1193 (citing Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432,434 (9th Cir. 1986)). 
44 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 464 (8th ed. 2004); See also Ringgold v. Black Entm't 
Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1997). 
45 Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192-1193 (9th Cir. 2004); See Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 
74-75. 
46 See Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 74-76. 
47 Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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emphasize that this principle has "long been a part of copyright law," the 
court quoted Judge Learned Hand's observation from eighty years ago: 
"[e]ven where there is some copying, that fact is not conclusive of 
infringement.,,48 As a result, the Ninth Circuit firmly established its 
acceptance of the de minimis doctrine as a triviality defense to a 
copyright infringement action.49 
B. THE AVERAGE-AUDIENCE TEST DETERLViIi"llcS WHEN 
UNAUTHORIZED COPYING IS DE MINIMIS 
To determine when an unauthorized copying is de rmmrms, the 
Newton Court relied on its own decision in Fisher v. Dees to hold that "a 
use is de minimis only if the average audience would not recognize the 
appropriation.,,50 The court was very explicit in concluding that the de 
minimis maxim looks to "the response of the average audience, or 
ordinary observer, to determine whether a use is infringing.,,51 Thus, in 
the Ninth Circuit, a successful de minimis defense to a copyright 
infringement claim will depend on whether the average audience, or 
ordinary observer, is able to recognize that a copying has taken place.52 
III. THE MAJORITY OPINION: THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
After establishing the average-audience test as the proper test for a 
de minimis analysis, the court turned to the analysis of the facts before 
it.53 First, the court analyzed the Beastie Boys' sample by examining the 
testimony of expert witnesses.54 After eliminating from consideration 
those elements that were properly licensed, the court measured the 
substantiality of the sample.55 Finally, the court concluded that if the 
sample is not substantial, then the average audience would not recognize 
it and the sample is thus de minimis and not actionable.56 Judge Susan P. 
Graber's dissent agreed with the legal principles set out in the majority, 
but disagreed with the majority's analysis of the expert witness 
1909)). 
48 [d. (quoting West Publ'g Co. v. Edward Thomson Co .• 169 F. 833, 861 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 
49 See id. 
50 [d.; See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 434 (9th Cir. 1986). 
51 Newton v. Diamond. 388 F.3d 1189. 1193 (9th Cir. 2004). 
52 See id. 
53 See id. 
54 [d. at 1194-1196. 
55 [d. at 1195-1196. 
56 [d. at 1196. 
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testimony. 57 
A. ANALYZING THE BEASTIE BOYS' SAMPLE 
The court recognized that the Beastie Boys had properly licensed 
the sound recording of Newton's "Choir" from ECM Records but had 
not licensed the underlying composition to "Choir" from Newton.58 
Thus, the case concerns only the infringement of Newton's actual written 
score of "Choir" as opposed to the sound recording. 59 As a result, the 
court began its analysis with the arduous process of filtering out the 
licensed elements of the sound recording from the unlicensed elements in 
Newton's score.60 Because this is a truly complex and challenging task, 
the court found it must rely on the testimony of expert witnesses in 
determining which elements of the sample are a result of the 
performance and which are indicated in the original score.61 
According to the majority, the expert witness testimony that Newton 
himself presented revealed that the elements and subtleties of the 
particular performance of "Choir" that the Beastie Boys sampled were 
largely the product of particular techniques employed by the performer 
and not the result of a rendition of the score.62 Dr. Christopher Dobrian 
of the University of California, Irvine, declared that "breath control," 
"portamento," and "emphasis of the upper partials of the flute's complex 
harmonic tone" are three elements that do not appear in the score of 
"Choir" but are present in the sampled performance.63 Because the 
sampled performance is performed by Newton himself, these elements 
are referred to collectively as the "Newton Technique.,,64 Because the 
"Newton Technique" did not appear in the score for "Choir," it was 
accordingly filtered out and removed from consideration in Newton's 
claim for infringement of his composition.65 
B. MEASURING THE SUBSTANTIALITY OF THE SAMPLE 
With the "Newton Technique" filtered out of consideration, the 
57 See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004) (1. Graber dissenting). 
58 /d. at 1193 (majority opinion). 
59 See id. 
60 Id. at 1193-1194. 
61 Id. at 1194. 
62 1d. 
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court turned to the heart of its inquiry: "whether the Beastie Boys' 
unauthorized use of the composition, as opposed to their authorized use 
of the sound recording, was substantial enough to sustain an 
infringement action.,,66 The substantiality of the Beastie Boys' sample 
was measured "by considering the qualitative and quantitative 
significance of the copied portion in relation to the plaintiff's work as a 
whole.,,67 Thus, in determining if a sample is substantial enough to 
support an infringement action, a court must decide if that sample is a 
quantitatively and qualitatively significant portion of the original work.68 
In determining the sample's quantitative significance the court 
looked at evidence of the length of the sample compared to the length of 
the original work as a whole.69 The sampled segment occurred once in 
the original piece and "[ w ]hen played ... the segment lasts six seconds 
and is roughly two percent of the four-and-a-half minute 'Choir' sound 
recording .... ,,70 The court concluded that this was not enough to 
qualify as a quantitatively significant portion of the original work.71 
The sample's qualitative significance was not as straightforward.72 
The court therefore relied on the expert testimony of renowned pianist 
and music theorist Dr. Lawrence Ferrara.73 Dr. Ferrara testified that "the 
compositional elements of the sampled section do not represent the heart 
or the hook of the 'Choir' composition, but rather are 'simple, minimal 
and insignificant.,,,74 According to the majority, no direct evidence 
rebutted Dr. Ferrara's conclusion that the sample was not a qualitatively 
significant portion of the entire work.75 In the majority's opinion, the 
other experts gave no information from which a jury could infer that the 
sample was a qualitatively significant portion of the original 
composition.76 By relying on the testimony of Ferrara, the court 
concluded that the sample the Beastie Boys used was not a quantitatively 
or qualitatively significant portion of Newton's "Choir.,,77 
66 [d. 
67 [d. at 1195. 
68 See ill. 
69 Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1194 (9th Cir. 2004). 
70 [d. at 1195-1196. 
71 [d. at 1195. 
72 See id. at 1196. 
73 [d.; See also http://education.nyu.edulmusic/facu1ty/ferrara_1awrence.html 
74 Newton, 388 F.3d at 1196 (quoting Beastie Boys' expert Dr. Lawrence Ferrara). 
75 [d. 
76 [d. 
77 See id. 
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C. IF THE SAMPLE Is NOT SUBSTANTIAL, IT FAILS THE A VERAGE-
AUDIENCE TEST 
After concluding that the sampled portion of "Choir" was neither a 
quantitatively nor a qualitatively significant portion of the work, the 
court returned to its legal foundation: the average-audience test.78 Based 
on the expert testimony that the sample is neither a quantitatively nor a 
qualitatively significant portion of Newton's "Choir", the court 
concluded "that an average audience would not discern Newton's hand 
as a composer, apart from his talent as a performer, from Beastie Boys' 
use of the sample.,,79 Therefore, the finding that the sample was neither 
quantitatively nor qualitatively significant to the original work as a whole 
is to say the sample is de minimis and an average audience would not 
recognize the appropriation. so In lay terms, because the sample was a 
"trite, generic three-note sequence," it follows that an average audience 
ld .. SI wou not recogmze It. 
D. THE DISSENT: SUMMARY JUDGMENT Is INAPPROPRIATE 
Circuit Judge Susan P. Graber filed a dissenting opinion concluding, 
"a finder of fact reasonably could find that Beastie Boys' use of sampled 
material was not de minimis."s2 It is important here to recognize that 
Judge Graber agreed with the legal principles that the majority laid out, 
but disagreed with the court's analysis of the evidence and expert 
testimony.s3 In accordance with the majority, Judge Graber affirmed the 
average-audience test as the method for determining whether an 
unauthorized use is de minimis.s4 However, Judge Graber's analysis of 
the evidence and expert testimony would lead to a different conclusion, 
where "the composition, standing alone, is distinctive .... "S5 
Judge Graber relied on the testimony of Dr. Christopher Dobrian of 
the University of California, Irvine, who described the sample used by 
the Beastie Boys as a direct result of a playing technique indicated in the 
score.S6 Dr. Dobrian explained that much of this technique is a result of 
78/d. 
79 1d. 
80 See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189,1196 (9th Cir. 2004). 
81 Id. (quoting Beastie Boys' expert Dr. Lawrence Ferrara). 
82/d. at 1197 (Graber, J., dissenting). 
83 See id. 
84 Id. 
85 1d. 
86 Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004) (Graber, J., dissenting). 
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the score itself and not personal performance, and any flautist's rendition 
of the score would yield the same sonic result. 87 Dr. Dobrian' s testimony 
certainly does seem to contradict the majority's filtering out of the 
"Newton Technique.',88 Further, Judge Graber complained that the 
majority had ignored other parts of Dr. Dobrian's relevant testimony that 
describes the sampled portion of "Choir" as unique and distinctive.89 In 
Judge Graber's view, this was evidence that reasonable ears could 
consider the sampled portion qualitatively significant when compared to 
the work as a whole.90 This evidence, in Judge Graber's opinion, created 
a genuine issue of material fact that should render summary judgment 
inappropriate.91 
Although Judge Graber's analysis of the sample of "Choir" differed 
from the majority, her approach was the same: the sample "is de minimis 
only if an average audience would not recognize [the] appropriation," 
where the reaction of the average audience is determined with the 
assistance of expert witness testimony.92 
IV. A DIFFERENT ApPROACH: THE INTENDED-AUDIENCE TEST 
In Newton, the Ninth Circuit squarely adopted the average-audience 
test in de minimis analysis for copyright infringement.93 Other circuits, 
however, have held that reliance on the language of the average-audience 
test caused the rule to become overbroad in practice, departing from the 
original logic on which the test was based.94 For example, the Fourth 
Circuit determined that the intended-audience test better reflects the 
theory of economic incentive on which copyright law is based.95 
87 [d. 
88 Compare [d. (indicating Dr. Dobrian's testimony states "that any flautist's performance of 
the sampled segment would be distinctive and recognizable, because the score itself is distinctive 
and recognizable."), with Newton, 388 F.3d at 1194 (majority opinion) (indicating that "the sound 
recording of 'Choir' is the product of Newton's highly developed performance techniques, rather 
than the result of a generic rendition of the composition."). 
89 Newton, 388 F.3d at 1198 (Graber, 1., dissenting). 
90 [d. 
91 [d. at 1197; See also 4 MELVILLEB. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 13.03[E][3][b 1 (2005). 
92 Newton, 388 F.3d at 1197 (Graber, 1., dissenting). 
93 [d. at 1196 (majority opinion). 
94 See, e.g., Dawson v. Hinshaw, 905 F.2d 731, 734 (4th Cir. 1990); See, e.g., Whelan 
Associates, Inc. v. laslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1233 (3rd Cir. 1986); See, e.g., 
Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 857 (6th Cir. 2003). 
95 Dawson, 905 F.2d at 734. 
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A. THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC INCENTIVE 
The theory that underlies the average-audience test with respect to 
copyright law is laid out in the seminal case of Arnstein v. Porter.96 Like 
Newton, Arnstein involved alleged copyright infringement of a musical 
composition.97 The intended purpose of protecting such compositions 
was stated by the court to be based on a theory of economic incentive, 
under which "[t]he plaintiffs legally protected interest is not, as such, his 
reputation as a musician but his interest in the potential financial returns 
from his compositions which derive from the lay public's approbation of 
his efforts.,,98 This economic incentive theory reflects what has long 
been the purpose behind Congress's grant of copyright: the 
"encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to 
advance public welfare through talents of authors and inventors in 
Science and useful ArtS.,,99 Thus, the Arnstein court declared, "[t]he 
question, therefore, is whether defendant took from plaintiff s works so 
much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the 
audience for whom such popular music is composed, that defendant 
wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff."loo 
The reaction of the lay listener is important to determine the effect of the 
appropriation on the plaintiffs market. 101 Perhaps as a testament to the 
soundness of the economic incentive theory, it would be almost forty-
five years before this logic would be reexamined and the role of the lay 
listener reconsidered. 102 
B. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S ADOPTION OF THE INTENDED-AUDIENCE 
TEST 
In Dawson v. Hinshaw, the Fourth Circuit reexamined the logic of 
Arnstein and the development of the average-aUdience test in light of the 
principles of copyright law and the underlying policies.103 While the 
Dawson court clearly supported the logic of the economic incentive 
theory as laid out in Arnstein, it explained that the reliance upon the lay 
listener had caused the rule to become too broad, ultimately departing 
96 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). 
97 [d. at 467. 
98 [d. at 473. 
99 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
100 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473. 
101 Dawson v. Hinshaw, 905 F.2d 731, 734 (4th Cir. 1990). 
102 See generally, Dawson v. Hinshaw, 905 F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1990). 
103 [d. at 733. 
11
Miller: Inadequacy of the Average-Audience Test
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2006
12 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36 
from the original logic fostered in Arnstein. 104 
The distinction between the type of work allegedly infringed upon 
in Arnstein and that in Dawson drove the court's conclusion.105 Dawson 
involved the copyright infringement of a spiritual arrangement, 106 
whereas Arnstein involved the copyright infringement of a popular 
composition. 107 The Dawson court concluded that, "under the facts 
before it ... the Arnstein court appropriately perceived 'lay listeners' and 
the works' 'audience' to be the same.,,108 However, the Dawson court 
correctly pointed out that the logic in Arnstein was founded upon the 
protection of the creator's market. 109 Thus, in evaluating the effect of an 
unauthorized use of a protected work on the creator's market, the lay 
listener is important only insofar as that listener accurately represents 
that market. 110 Because Dawson involved the copyright infringement of 
a spiritual arrangement as opposed to a popular recording, the Fourth 
Circuit determined that the average lay listener might inaccurately reflect 
the market for that type of work. III Thus, an application of the average-
audience test to the facts in Dawson could potentially look to the reaction 
of a group other than the creator's market. 112 This result would seem to 
contradict the economic incentive theory of copyright law as expressed 
in Arnstein. 
Based on this interpretation of the economic incentive theory 
originally laid out in Arnstein and supported by the purpose of copyright 
law generally, the Dawson court held that when inquiring into an illicit 
appropriation, "a district court must consider the nature of the intended 
audience of the plaintiffs work.,,113 The court wisely set forth a more 
narrowly tailored test because, over time, the average-audience test had 
become overbroad and had departed from the foundation upon which it 
stood. I 14 
104 Id. at 734. 
lOS Id. at 737. 
106 Id. at 732. 
107 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464,468 (2d Cir. 1946). 
108 Dawson v. Hinshaw, 905 F.2d 731, 734 (4th Cir. 1990). 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
III See id. at 737-738 (finding that although "a lay person's reaction may be an accurate 
indicator of extent to which those in the market for a popular recording will perceive another 
recording to be substantially similar, a lay person's reaction might not be an accurate indicator of 
how expert choral directors would compare two spiritual arrangements."). 
112 See id. at 735-736. 
113 Id. at 736. 
114 Dawson v. Hinshaw, 905 F.2d 731, 734 (4th Cir. 1990). 
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V. THE NINTH CIRCUIT: REASONING AND PRACTICE 
The Fourth Circuit's clear adoption of the intended-audience test 
based on the sound theory of economic incentive provides a useful 
perspective in reviewing the history of Ninth Circuit jurisprudence. I 15 
While the court in Newton v. Diamond squarely adopted the average-
audience test with respect to de minimis analysis, a closer reading of that 
and prior Ninth Circuit opinions indicates that perhaps its reasoning is 
not radically different from that which the Fourth Circuit employed. I 16 
A. SID & MARTY KROFFTV. McDoNALD'S: FOUNDATION AND LOGIC 
Sid & Marty Krofft v. McDonald's is a landmark case in Ninth 
Circuit copyright jurisprudence. ll7 The court concluded that "[t]he test 
to be applied in determining whether there is substantial similarity in 
expressions shall be labeled an intrinsic one depending on the response 
of the ordinary reasonable person.,,1l8 At first blush the court seemed to 
squarely establish the reaction of the ordinary lay person as the test for 
the substantiality of a copyright infringement which would, in tum, 
support the Newton court's holding. However, further probing of the 
opinion suggests otherwise. 
First, the court relied upon the logic of Arnstein in its application of 
the aforementioned test by quoting, "[t]he question, therefore, is whether 
defendant took from plaintiff s works so much of what is pleasing to the 
(eyes and) ears of lay (persons), who comprise the audience for whom 
such popular (works are) composed . ... ,,119 In looking to the reaction 
of the audience for whom the work was composed, the court adopted the 
economic incentive theory and the importance of the creator's market. 120 
Then, in an application of that foundational theory to the facts of its case, 
the court looked to the reactions of the works' specifically intended 
audience: children. l2l "The present case demands an even more intrinsic 
determination because both plaintiff s and defendant's works are directed 
to an audience of children. This raises the particular factual issue of the 
115 See id. at 736. 
116 See infra notes 124-128 and accompanying text. 
117 Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977); See 
also Dawson v. Hinshaw, 905 F.2d 731, 734 (4th Cir. 1990). 
118 Sid & Marty Krafft Television, 562 F.2d at 1164. 
119 [d. at 1165 (quoting Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 472-473 (2d Cir. 1946)) (emphasis 
added). 
120 See Sid & Marty Krafft Television, 562 F.2d at 1164. 
121 [d. at 1166. 
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impact of the respective works upon the minds and imaginations of 
young people.,,122 Although the court was establishing the benchmark as 
the reaction of the ordinary reasonable person, a closer examination of 
the court's logic reveals that it was in fact looking more toward the 
reaction of the ordinary, reasonable person who is part of the works' 
intended audience in an effort to protect the creator's market. 123 
B. NEWTON V. DIAMOND: REASONING AND LANGUAGE RECONSIDERED 
In Newton, a similar inconsistency exists between the language of 
the test applied and the analysis of the court. In the conclusion of its 
analysis, the court relied upon the expert opinion of Beastie Boys' expert 
Dr. Lawrence Ferrara. 124 It was Dr. Ferrara's opinion that the Beastie 
Boys' sample was not qualitatively significant, which partly provided the 
court's basis for concluding that an average audience would not 
recognize Newton's composition from the Beastie Boys' unauthorized 
use. 125 However, Dr. Ferrara is not representative of an average audience 
but rather is exactly the type of person that represents the specific 
intended market of such an avant-garde jazz score. 126 Someone likely to 
purchase such a work would have expertise in line with that of Dr. 
Ferrara. 127 Looking to his reaction is similar to looking to the reaction of 
someone likely to be in a purchasing position for Newton's work. l2S In 
its reliance on the opinion of the creator's market, the Newton court was 
not looking to the response of the average audience but was really 
looking to the response of the intended audience. 
VI. THE INTENDED-AUDIENCE TEST AND MUSIC SAMPLING: BENEFITS 
AND BURDENS 
Courts and scholars alike have examined the intended-audience test 
in consideration of its benefits and burdens when practically applied. 129 
122 Id. 
123 See id. at 1164-1166; See also Dawson v. Hinshaw, 905 F.2d 731, 734-735 (4th Cir. 1990). 
124 Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004). 
125 Id. 
126 Dawson v. Hinshaw, 905 F.2d 731, 736 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting that "[sluch an inquiry may 
include, and in no doubt many cases will require, admission of testimony ... from those who 
possess expertise with references to the tastes and perceptions of the intended audience. "). 
127 See id. at 737. 
128 See id. 
129 See, e.g., Dawson v. Hinshaw, 905 F.2d 731, 736 (4th Cir. 1990) (arguing that "the lay 
observer test spares a court the burden of inquiring into . . . the nature of the works' intended 
aUdience."); See, e.g., Paul M. Grinvalsky, Comment, Idea·Expression in Musical Analysis and the 
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It is true that the intended-audience test places a burden on the court in 
examining the nature of such an aUdience. 13o However, this burden is 
outweighed by the benefit of providing more focused guidance which 
will reduce the possibility of erroneous findings, address the needs of 
increasingly complex music and media, and properly sustain the true 
purpose of copyright law. 131 
The courts have recognized that audience tests in general inherently 
involve issues of fact, and as a result, summary judgment has been 
disfavored. 132 It follows that an application of the intended-audience test 
would involve increased issues of fact, requiring increased analysis on 
the part the courts, and an increased need for such issues of fact to be 
litigated at trial. 133 Indeed, the Dawson court explained the increased 
burden of shifting from the lay observer test to that of the intended 
audience: "[t]he lay observer test spares the court the burden of inquiring 
into, and drawing conclusions from, the nature of the works' intended 
audience.,,134 This burden is very real and should be weighed against the 
benefits of the test. 
Ambiguity and vagueness with respect to the average-audience test 
have bred inconsistencies among the courts: some courts have defined 
the test as the response of the ordinary lay listener without the aid of 
analytic dissection or expert testimony,135 whereas some courts have 
looked more narrowly at the specific audience to whom the work is 
directed,136 and still other courts have relied upon expert witness 
testimony to gauge the reaction of an average audience. 137 Such 
inconsistent application of the law increases the risk of erroneous 
findings. However, application of the more narrowly tailored language 
of the intended-audience test will provide more specific guidance to the 
courts and therefore reduce this risk.138 For example, in Newton the court 
Role of the Intended Audience in Musical Copyright Infringement, 28 Cal. W. L. Rev. 395, 428 
(1991-1992) (discussing how "Hinshaw's concerns about an unwieldy potential" can be controlled 
with relatively few safeguards.). 
130 Dawson, 905 F.2d at 736. 
131 See Paul M. Grinvalsky, Comment, Idea-Expression in Musical Analysis and the Role of 
the Intended Audience in Musical Copyright Infringement, 28 Cal. W. L. Rev. 395,428 (1991-1992) 
(arguing that "so long as courts hesitate to apply the intended-audience test ... courts run the risk of 
too often finding infringement where none actually exists, or vice versa. "). 
1977). 
132 See Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 
133 See id. 
134 Dawson v. Hinshaw, 905 F.2d 731, 736 (4th Cir. 1990). 
135 Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 424-425 (9th Cir. 1987). 
136 Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 1977). 
137 Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004). 
138 See Dawson v. Hinshaw, 905 F.2d 731, 737 (4th Cir. 1990). 
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looked to the opinions of renowned music theorists in determining 
whether the appropriation was substantial or de minimis. 139 In doing so 
the court was essentially looking to the reaction of those with sufficient 
expertise to understand the language of the work, or the intended 
audience. 140 Another court faced with a similar factual scenario could 
just as easily look to the reaction of the ordinary observer under the 
explicit language of the average-audience test, and thereby inconsistently 
analyze the similarity of the works in question. 141 However, with the 
firm guidance of the intended-audience test, any court faced with such a 
scenario would be guided to the specific reaction of those people who· 
possess the relevant expertise to understand the language of the work in 
question. 142 
Modem music continues to expand in diversity, scope, and style. 143 
Such genres as jazz, avant-garde music, minimalism, microtonal music, 
electronic a, and world music continue to increase the palette of musical 
form and expression. l44 This expansion of the modem musical idiom 
will only further expose the inadequacies of the average-audience test in 
cases of compositional copyright infringement. As seen in Newton, 
application of the average audience standard to a case involving the 
appropriation of a written score of an avant-garde jazz composition by a 
sound recording of a popular rap song has the potential to create 
confusing and inconsistent results. 145 A more narrowly tailored focus on 
the intended audience of the plaintiff s work founded on a protection of 
that plaintiff s market would afford the courts increased guidance in an 
ever-expanding musical landscape. 
Perhaps most important, the intended-audience test would signal a 
return to copyright's fundamental purpose: the protection of the creator's 
market. 146 Reliance upon the average audience and the lay observer has 
139 Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1l89, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004); See also 
http://education.nyu.edu/musiclfaculty/ferrara_lawrence.htmI 
140compareNewtonv.Diamond,388F.3dI189,1196 (9th Cir. 2004) (relying on Beastie 
Boys' expert Dr. Lawrence Ferrara to determine the substantiality of the sample), with Dawson v. 
Hinshaw, 905 F.2d 731, 737 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding that the Ninth Circuit holding in Krofft looked 
to "the specific audience for which the products were intended."). 
141 See Dawson v. Hinshaw, 905 F.2d 731,737 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that "a lay person's 
reaction might not be an accurate indicator of how expert choral directors would compare two 
spiritual arrangements."). 
142 See id. at 736 (holding that "the court's inquiry should focus on whether a member of the 
intended audience would find the two works to be substantially similar."). 
143 Petition For Writ Of Certiorari at 20, Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(No. 04-1219). 
144 [d. 
145 See generally, Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004). 
146 See, e.g., Dawson v. Hinshaw, 905 F.2d 731,734 (4th Cir. 1990). 
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fueled the development of a test that is overbroad and increasingly 
unable to fulfill the purpose for which it was created. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In Newton v. Diamond, the Ninth Circuit has chosen explicitly to 
adopt the average-audience test when detennining de minimis copying in 
copyright infringement actions. 147 However, its reliance upon the 
testimony of expert witnesses with specific knowledge relevant to the 
work suggests that the court was looking not to the response of the 
average audience but to the response of the intended audience for whom 
the copyrighted work was created. Additionally, other landmark 
copyright cases decided by the Ninth Circuit have similarly considered 
the audience to whom the copyrighted work was directed while 
employing the average audience and lay observer language. 148 Although 
effectively applying a much narrower test, in Newton the Ninth Circuit 
has chosen to continue to propagate the vagueness and ambiguity that 
surrounds substantial similarity and de minimis analysis. The court 
would have been much better served by narrowing the scope of the test 
to that which it effectively applied: the intended-audience test. 
Music is a language that continues to grow and expand. 149 Modem 
music includes an array of diverse genres that cross-pollinate and inspire 
new forms of music. 150 The clash of such genres is exemplified in 
Newton by an analysis that must look to the similarities of a written score 
of an avant-garde jazz flute composition and a sound recording of a 
popular rap song. 151 In order to better serve the needs of such complex 
and diverse problems, the Ninth Circuit should have elected to shed the 
outdated and vague language of the average-audience test and adopted a 
more focused analysis which remains true to the fundamental purpose of 
copyright law. The Ninth Circuit should have expressly adopted the 
intended-audience test. 
147 See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004). 
148 See Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 
1977). 
149 See Petition For Writ Of Certiorari at 20, Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 
2004) (No. 04-1219). 
150 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
lSI See generally Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1194 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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